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ABSTRACT. Delay of gratification (DoG), the ability to
reject immediately available smaller rewards in favor of
later larger rewards, has been a topic of continuous re-
search interest for almost 60 years. Although numer-
ous studies have explored this construct and its effects
on wellbeing, social behavior, cognitive abilities, and
academic success in children, DoG studies in adulthood
and old age are scarce. Instead, delay discounting
(DD), that is, the degree to which individuals devalue
delayed rewards, has been used in samples of adults
and older individuals, and is of particular interest in
clinical studies. Findings from DD research suggest that
the preference for delayed rewards increases from
childhood to early adulthood, and then decreases
from middle age to old age. The main aim of this re-
view is to elucidate the importance of DoG in adult-
hood and old age. First, the review explores the theo-
retical status of DoG by specifying the relationships and
distinctions between DoG and related constructs. Sec-
ond, it provides an overview of DoG measurements,
from traditional to novel. Third, the effects of DoG on
development and wellbeing are explored. Fourth, age-
related differences in DoG are summarized. Lastly, the
review closes with conclusions, clinical implications,
and the outlook for possible further research directions.
(Aging Clin Exp Res 2012; 24: 6-14)
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most every day of our lives: the choice between an im-
mediate reward and a larger delayed reward which implies
the investment of time and effort. In scientific language,
this behavior is termed Delay of Gratification (DoG) – the
voluntary postponement of immediate gratification for the
sake of later and better rewards (2).
DoG has been a topic of psychological research interest
for almost 60 years. The DoG paradigm was inspired by
the work of psychologist Walter Mischel, who is well-
known for his pioneering DoG experiments. The concept
was originally investigated in children, and there is only a
small body of research on DoG in adulthood and old
age. However, it is not only children and adolescents who
choose to delay or not to delay gratification; adults and el-
derly people also have to make daily choices between im-
mediate and delayed pleasures. For example, they may
have to decide between spending their money (e.g., a life
insurance payout) now, or saving it for their heirs. Like-
wise, diabetes patients may decide against delicious
sweets in view of the expected health payoffs. From a
lifespan perspective, practical examples are plentiful:
stopping smoking to reduce health risks, or working for
the gratification of a pension in old age. Thus, DoG is al-
so highly relevant in old age.
In this review, we first describe the theoretical basis of
DoG and its link to related constructs. We then provide
an overview of traditional and novel assessment proce-
dures and empirical findings with regard to the effects of
DoG on cognition, motivation, social variables, and
wellbeing, and summarize age-related differences in
DoG. The review closes with conclusions, clinical im-
plications, and the outlook for possible further research
directions.
INTRODUCTION
If you had the choice between one marshmallow now
or two marshmallows later, which would you prefer?
This question from Walter Mischel’s (1) original “marsh-
mallow test” represents a dilemma which confronts us al-
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THEORETICAL STATUS OF DELAY
OF GRATIFICATION
Much theoretical work has been done to explain DoG
behavior and to localize DoG in the nomological network
of the related constructs of self-regulation, delay dis-
counting, and executive function.
Self-regulation
Self-regulation, a complex multifaceted personality
process, involves internal and/or transactional processes
that enable goal-directed activities to be maintained (3).
Both self-regulation and DoG involve the active man-
agement of goals (4). Some authors see DoG as a mea-
sure of self-regulation (e.g., 5); indeed, the DoG paradigm
has been used in studies on the development of self-
regulation (6). Likewise, Academic DoG, i.e., delaying
gratification in order to attain academic success, and
self-regulated learning strategies are closely related (7), and
theories of self-regulation also draw on DoG (3). Successful
self-regulation is necessarily accompanied by successful
DoG – for example, when individuals prevent themselves
from thinking about immediately available rewards (1).
Conversely, failure of self-regulation (i.e., choosing the im-
mediate reward) tends to be accompanied by an atten-
tional shift to that reward (8).
Delay discounting
Humans discount the value of delayed gratification. Giv-
en the choice between two equal rewards, one immediate
and one delayed, they usually take the immediate one. A
delayed reward is chosen only if it is larger than the im-
mediate one (9). DD is the degree to which an individual
devalues delayed rewards (10, 11). In other words, as the
delay increases, the value of the reward and hence the
likelihood of its sustained choice decreases. The hyperbolic
function most accurately describes DD curves for de-
layed reinforcers (12).
Although DoG and delay discounting (DD) are often
seen as related or even identical, the empirical evidence al-
so suggests differences between the two (13, 14). Where-
as DoG calls for sustained choices, DD involves commit-
ment choices. The “sustained choice” procedure used in
traditional DoG experiments requires individuals to sustain
their choice of the delayed reward during the delay period,
overcoming the temptation to defect to the immediate,
smaller, and continually available reward. DD procedures,
in contrast, confront participants with unchangeable and
separate choices for either the immediately available or the
postponed stimulus on each trial (14, 15).
Executive functions
The term “executive function(ing)” covers various
functions and skills that “enable a person to engage suc-
cessfully in purposeful, self-serving behaviors” (16, p.
42). Executive functions include, for example, attention-
al flexibility (17) or inhibition (of predominant responses)
(18). Executive subfunctions cooperate in goal-directed
problem-solving (17) and provide the basis for making de-
cisions, maintaining action, and regulating the self (19).
Zelazo and Müller (20) distinguished between hot and
cold executive functions. Cold executive functions are
primarily cognitively operated and emotionally neutral
(e.g., working memory, planning), whereas hot executive
functions are affectively loaded (e.g., delay of rewards, reg-
ulation of motivation and emotion, stimulus control) (21,
22). From this theoretical perspective, DoG involves hot
executive functions – including the anticipation of future
consequences and perseverance.
There is scientific consensus that the frontal lobes, es-
pecially the prefrontal cortex, are the neural substrates of
executive functions (18, 23). More specifically, the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex is seen as the brain area in-
volved in hot executive functions, and the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex in cold ones.
ASSESSMENT OF DELAY OF
GRATIFICATION – FROM THE TRADITIONAL
TO THE NOVEL
Traditional behavioral assessment of delay of
gratification in childhood
There are basically two traditional procedures of DoG
assessment (see Silverman, [24]): First, Walter Mischel
developed the continuous measure of DoG for studies
with young children (usually between the ages of 4 and 6
years). In this procedure, the experimenter leaves the
participants alone in a room with a bell and one marsh-
mallow in front of them. The experimenter informs the
children that they will get a smaller reward (usually one
marshmallow or one cookie) if they call the experimenter
by ringing the bell. However, if they wait until the exper-
imenter returns (after about 20 minutes; participants were
not told how long they would have to wait), they will get a
larger reward (two marshmallows). The number of seconds
of waiting is recorded and used as a continuous variable (1).
Second, the dichotomous measure of DoG involves a
single question. The experimenter asks participants
whether they would prefer a small reward now, or a
larger reward later (e.g., in one hour). This procedure
yields a dichotomous variable, as participants can only
make one choice between two options (24).
Self-report questionnaires for adults
It has been proposed that DoG measures used with
adults require not only meaningful delay intervals (days and
weeks instead of minutes), but also meaningful and at-
tractive rewards (25). However, it is difficult to find viable
and non-trivial rewards for adults. Consequently, many re-
searchers have used questionnaires to assess DoG in
adults. Table 1 provides an overview of the self-report
questionnaires available for the broad field of DoG.
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The advantage of these self-report measures is clearly
that studies can easily apply them to samples of adults and
older people. However, all the approaches to assessing
DoG in adulthood described so far depart from the orig-
inal idea of a behavioral measure of self-control. A further
problem of assessing DoG by self-report questionnaires is
that responses may be affected by social desirability bias.
In other words, respondents may present themselves as
having higher ability to delay gratification than is actual-
ly the case.
Single behavioral measures of delay of gratifica-
tion for adolescents and adults
A study of individuals with schizophrenia and con-
trols used a board game for DoG measurement. At des-
ignated fields on the board, participants had to decide be-
tween two immediate snacks (chocolate drops, gummy
bears, or crisps) or continuing to play and receiving dou-
ble that amount (four delayed snacks) at the end of the
game. The authors implemented a large number of trials
(70 times two vs four snacks) and observed a decrease in
impulsive choices over the choice of the game (26).
In sum, most studies on DoG and DD have applied
monetary rewards. Some authors used hypothetical mon-
ey (e.g., 27), others real monetary incentives (e.g., 25).
Wulfert et al. (25) highlighted two aspects requiring con-
sideration in experimental DoG studies. First, the incen-
tives offered must be attractive enough to motivate par-
ticipants. For instance, money is an almost universal in-
centive. Second, it is important to bear in mind that the
amount of a reward and its delay interact dependently (28-
30). For example, most people would choose $200 in 20
weeks over $190 in 19 weeks, but $190 immediately
rather than $200 in a week’s time (31). Thus, in DoG
studies, choices between two incentives should include a
preference equilibrium at the beginning. In particular,
monetary choice tasks should involve varying amounts of
money and delay intervals (25).
Comprehensive behavioral measure of delay of
gratification in adulthood
The Delay of Gratification Test for Adults (DoG-A) is a
more comprehensive behavioral measure of motivation-
al self-regulation which can be applied with adults and old-
er people (32). It consists of four decision tasks involving
four different types of rewards – snacks, hypothetical
money, real money, and magazines (partly adapted from
25, 26). We refer interested readers to (32) for a com-
prehensive description of the DoG-A and evaluation and
validation results.
EFFECTS OF DELAY OF GRATIFICATION
Numerous studies have investigated the effects of
DoG on wellbeing, social behavior, cognitive abilities,
and academic success. Although most studies to date
have focused on the effects of DoG in children and ado-
lescents, there have been some studies with samples of
adults and older people. Table 2 lists their core results.
AGE-RELATED DIFFERENCES IN DELAY OF
GRATIFICATION
The ability of patience (e.g., delaying rewards) seems
to change across the lifespan. Everyday observations
show that people become increasingly patient with age:
children are less willing to wait than adults, and even ado-
lescents often react impulsively (33).
To our knowledge, the only existing study to have
used a DoG measure to compare different age groups is
our own (32). The sample was divided into three age
groups of between 60 and 94 years. There was a non-sig-
nificant trend, the highest DoG being found in the group
of those aged 60-69 years, and the lowest in those aged
over 80 years. However, there are several studies which
used a DD measure.
Comparison of delay of gratification across
the lifespan
Green et al. (15) conducted the first study comparing
children (mean age: 12 yrs), adolescents (20 yrs) and
older adults (67 yrs) with regard to DD choices between
Table 2 - Effects of delay of gratification across the lifespan.
Stage in the High DoG as a predictor for … /
lifespan Correlations of DoG with …
Childhood - Attention control (1)
- Low DoG in children with obesity (77)
Adolescence - Intelligence (78);
- Ego resilience, ego control (61);
- Inhibition, cognitive control (79);
- Academic and social competencies, self-control,
ability to pursue goals (13)
- Higher discounting rates in adolescents with
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (80)
Adulthood - Students: academic performance, motivation,
help-seeking, self-efficacy, task-value,
goal orientation (75);
- Intelligence, academic achievement,
need for achievement (78, 81);
- Hemodialysis patients: better health behavior,
self-efficacy, compliance (60);
- Life satisfaction, self-worth (60)
- Higher discounting rates in pathological
gamblers (82), individuals abusing alcohol and
drugs (83), antisocial personality disorder (84),
obesity (85), schizophrenia (86), traumatic brain
injury (87), and social anxiety (88)
Old age - Motivation regulation, optimism,
facets of conscientiousness
- Satisfaction with life, fewer depressive
symptoms, anxiety, hostility, and perceived
stress (32)
R. Drobetz, A. Maercker and S. Forstmeier
10 Aging Clin Exp Res, Vol. 24, No. 1
had to choose between a sooner or later illness (DD in
bouts of flu; e.g., 1-day flu immediately vs 10-day flu in 1
year). The findings demonstrated that the middle-aged
group had the lowest DD rates and that the younger
and older individuals discounted most in monetary and hol-
iday choices. The findings did not support the hypothesis
of Rogers (34), but are consistent with a theory of Sozou
and Seymour (37) (see next section), according to which
DoG increases until middle age, after which it decreases
steadily with age.
To sum up, some authors report a curvilinear rela-
tionship between DD and age (37, 38), middle-aged
adults having the lowest discounting rates (high self-con-
trol) and younger and older individuals having higher
rates (low self-control). Early in life, DD rates are high be-
cause the environment still has to be explored and the fu-
ture is uncertain. In later life, the future again becomes in-
secure and risky as diverse capacities decline. Relative to
Trostel and Taylor (38), the model of Sozou and Seymour
(37) hypothesizes a steeper decrease in discounting rates
from the age of 40. Both theories are inconsistent with
the hypotheses of Rogers (34), who predicts a linear
decrease in DD across the lifespan, with no middle-age
peak. Taken together, the hypotheses of Trostel and
Taylor (38) and of Sozou and Seymour (37) are not in-
dependent (33). For instance, the age-related decline in
fertility may affect the expectancy of enjoying the pleasure
of delayed rewards in the future.
Time perspective and subjective life-expectancy –
contribution to evolutionary theories
Green et al. (36) proposed that DoG may become less
important as people increasingly see their life expectan-
cy as limited. Although the authors compared various age
groups, they did not include measures of subjective life ex-
pectancy. As such, they could not analyze this potential-
ly important influencing factor. Time-perspective, a fun-
damental component in the construction of psychological
time, is the result of cognitive processes which divide one
individual’s experience into past, present, and future
temporal frames (39). Subjective life expectancy is the
number of years an individual expects to live (40).
Some humans are predominantly present-oriented,
others are primarily future-oriented. The former prefer im-
mediate gratification and have less impulse control. The
latter focus on delayed gratification – they make choices
based on the estimated cost/benefit ratio of a future
pleasure or action. They are also better able to control
their impulses (41).
Socio-emotional selectivity theory (42) postulates that
individuals focus more on the present and less on the fu-
ture when they realize that the rest of their life is limited.
Thus, instead of future payoffs, they focus on making the
right choices now. This influences both their decisions and
their actions, as they pay more attention to subjective and
immediate vs delayed hypothetical monetary rewards.
The results revealed a lifespan developmental trend: the
rate of discounting was highest in children (i.e., low self-
control) and lowest in older adults (i.e., high self-con-
trol). This quantitative age difference in DD may be at-
tributable to children’s lack of experience with long delay,
or to their greater impulsivity. The findings support the
evolutionary perspective of Rogers (34). However, Read
and Read (33) identified some limitations. First, partici-
pants came from heterogeneous backgrounds (e.g., un-
dergraduate students vs older individuals from a study par-
ticipant pool). Second, subsample sizes were quite small
(12 participants per age group). Third, the researchers did
not control for important influencing variables such as
gender, socio-economic status, marital status, health
status, etc. Most critically, there were no middle-aged par-
ticipants.
Harrison, Lau and Williams (35) estimated the DD
rates of 268 Danish citizens aged between 19 and 75
years. They found a decline of DD with increasing age.
Thus, they confirmed the findings of Green et al. (15). In
a further study, Green et al. (36) explored the role of age
and income in DD (using the same procedure as in their
previous study). They compared three groups: 20
younger adults (upper income group; mean age: 33.3 yrs)
and 40 older adults equally divided into upper (70.7
yrs) and lower income groups (70.8 yrs). Although the
younger and older upper income groups did not differ in
terms of DD, the older lower income group had higher
DD rates than either the younger or the older upper in-
come groups. Some limitations of this study need to
be mentioned: small sample size, unequal distribution of
men and women, exclusion of middle-aged individuals
and lower income younger adults, and lack of control for
influencing factors. Overall, Green at al. (36) could not
confirm a systematic decrease in DD from childhood to
old age.
Read and Read (33) identified some flaws in the pio-
neering study of Green et al. (15) and tried to overcome
them in a new study investigating DD across the lifespan.
First, their study involved 123 participants between 19
and 89 years: not only a young (mean age: 25 yrs) and an
old group (75 yrs), but also a middle-aged group (44
yrs). Gender distribution was also equal in all three
groups, and the authors controlled for income and wealth
as well as for health status and health-related behavior.
Read and Read (33) measured several dimensions of
DD: first, participants had to choose between immediate
smaller vs later larger hypothetical amounts of money (DD
in monetary choices). The monetary rewards were fixed,
but the time-spans varied (e.g., immediate vs in 1 year; in
7 vs in 10 years). Second, respondents completed a
questionnaire by tapping their choices between less hol-
iday earlier and more holiday later (DD in holidays; e.g.,
1 day in 1 year vs 21 days in 3 years). Third, individuals
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intuitive aspects (12). The prioritization of immediate vs
delayed rewards thus changes with age. If older adults
are unsure whether they will benefit from delayed re-
wards in the future, because they feel that time is run-
ning out, they may well favor a certain reward in the
present. Behavioral economic models support these
ideas: older adults seem to take their subjective life ex-
pectancy (number of remaining years) into consideration
in economic decision processes. Greater rates of delay
discounting are reported in older adults because in-
creasing age implies a higher risk of not surviving to col-
lect a delayed reward (42).
Steinberg et al. (43) focused on age-related differences
in future orientation and DD in individuals aged between
10 and 30 years. Future orientation subsumes cognitive,
motivational, affective, attitudinal and evaluative con-
structs, including time-perspective and the degree to which
individuals think about their future lives or imagine possi-
ble future circumstances (44, 45). The authors measured
DD with a monetary choice procedure and future orien-
tation with a newly developed scale (see Table 1). The re-
sults showed that adolescents aged between 10 and 13
years describe a weaker future orientation than participants
aged 16 and older. First, they more often prefer smaller
and sooner to delayed, larger rewards. Second, they de-
scribe themselves as less concerned about their future
and less likely to anticipate the consequences of deci-
sions. Surprisingly, future orientation and not impulsivity
(measured with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; see Table
1) significantly mediated the age differences in DD.
CONCLUSIONS
Clinical implications
DoG is an important predictor of various cognitive abil-
ities, motivation to change, health behaviors, and well-
being. With respect to health behavior, DoG plays a de-
cisive role in, for example, the decision to abstain from ex-
cessive sunbathing in order to reduce the risk of con-
tracting skin cancer in old age, or to engage in regular ex-
ercise to keep fit and healthy. DoG may also be essential
in maintaining health behavior – a fact which may be ex-
ploited by programs promoting health-related behavior. In
addition, DoG is not only important in the field of primary
prevention. The success of secondary and tertiary pre-
vention also depends on self-regulated behavior – for
example, in minimizing the negative effects of chronic dis-
eases such as rheumatism, hypertonia, diabetes, HIV
and COPD. In sum, compliant behavior reduces costs for
social insurance systems.
Reasons for lack of delay of gratification studies
in adulthood and old age
Why have DoG studies to date largely neglected adult-
hood and old age? One answer is simply that the original
continuous measure of DoG is only suitable for children.
Mischel’s original DoG paradigm (the "marshmallow
test", 46) is of limited, if any, value for studies with ado-
lescents and adults, because the delay intervals were
adapted to children’s experience and perception of time,
and thus span only a few minutes. In contrast, studies with
adults require both meaningful DoG intervals (days or
weeks) and meaningful rewards. Assessment of DoG by
self-report questionnaires may produce biased results,
due to the problem of social desirability (25). It is only re-
cently that an age-appropriate DoG test has been devel-
oped by the present authors (32).
Several studies have focused on DD from childhood to
old age, most of them using hypothetical monetary
choice procedures which have gained broad acceptance
in psychological and economic research. Although DoG
is a multidimensional construct (47, 48) which may differ
from domain to domain, it is still unclear whether low DD
rates imply a general preference for delayed rewards. In
fact, in a study with the newly developed DoG test, the
snacks score proved to be the best indicator of wellbeing,
although the various reward types had low-to-medium in-
tercorrelations (32). By the same token, a factor analysis
in a study with college student leaders showed that DoG
could be divided into dimensions such as achievement ori-
entation and career objectives (47). Similarly, the concept
of academic DoG limits DoG to that context (achievement
of academic rewards). Experimenters must also bear in
mind that DoG is highly dependent on the situation (e.g.,
21). Nevertheless, a general factor of DoG may also
make sense, because individuals can potentially exhibit
high DoG in many dimensions. For example, one indi-
vidual may show high academic DoG and high DoG in
health behavior. Moreover, there is little evidence to
support the idea of DoG as an ability which is both
learned and generalized across situations (8, 49). Sever-
al authors have emphasized that the DD task is an indi-
cator of actual decisions, as DD rates do not differ be-
tween real and hypothetical monetary rewards (50-52).
Another reason for the neglect of DoG studies in
adulthood may be that self-regulation can easily be mea-
sured with self-report questionnaires such as the Volitional
Components Inventory (VCI; 53), Short Self-Regulation
Questionnaire (SSRQ; 54), Brief Self-Control Scale
(BSCS; 55) or Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; 56).
Executive functions have also been broadly examined in
impaired and unimpaired older adults. Diverse measures
are applicable, depending on the domain of executive
functioning: for example, task switching (Trail Making Test
- Part B; 57) or inhibition of predominant responses
(Stroop Color-Word Test; 58).
Does the ability to delay gratification decrease
or increase with age?
On one hand, the ability to self-regulate seems to be sta-
ble across the lifespan (25). Some authors have suggested
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that DoG likewise takes shape in childhood and remains ro-
bust in later life (59-61). On the other hand, changes in the
ability to delay gratification across the lifespan are obvious
and observable in everyday life: young children are more
impulsive and impatient, whereas adults and older indi-
viduals are more patient, better able to resist their impulses,
and more willing to wait (33). In other words, possible long-
term consequences weigh more heavily and seriously for
adults. Neuropsychological evidence supports these ideas:
the frontal lobe regions (“cold” system) mature as children
grow up, whereas the “hot” system is already fully devel-
oped (62). However, as older individuals become aware of
the limited time available to them, they may come to be-
have “like there’s no tomorrow” (36). Thus, the variables
of time-perspective and subjective life expectancy give
new impetus to evolutionary theories, and may help to ex-
plain why DoG may decrease in adulthood and old age. In
addition, neuropsychological evidence suggests that DoG
may decrease in both unimpaired and impaired older
adults – for example, in individuals with dementia, a disease
with dramatically increasing prevalence rates (63). Empirical
findings point to relations between executive functions,
DoG, and frontal functioning (64-66). In normal aging,
there is a neural loss in the prefrontal cortex (67, 68). Neu-
ropsychological behavioral evidence also describes a decline
in executive functions with advancing age (e.g., 69). Indi-
viduals with dementia also have significantly more deficits
in executive functions than unimpaired controls (e.g.,
70). In sum, there is a need for validated DoG measures for
application in adults.
Potential future studies of delay of gratification
First, longitudinal analyses could investigate stability vs
changes in DoG across the lifespan. Second, the possible
protective effects of DoG on health, wellbeing and satis-
faction with life in adulthood and old age warrant more de-
tailed investigation. Third, further studies should examine
whether DoG helps to protect against cognitive decline.
Specifically, high DoG may result in high cognitive and
motivational reserves. Whereas cognitive reserve helps the
human brain to cope with impairment through activation
of pre-existing cognitive resources and compensatory
mechanisms (71), motivational reserve refers to motiva-
tional aspects of cognitive aging (72). For instance, indi-
viduals with high DoG across the lifespan may show
higher educational and occupational attainment – two in-
dices of cognitive reserve (71). DoG is a behavioral mea-
sure of motivational abilities which are discussed as pro-
tective factors in emotional and cognitive health (72).
Fourth, the neural substrates of DoG are also worth ex-
ploring. Structural MRI studies could further examine
the relationship between DoG and the frontal lobes.
Functional MRI studies could contribute to elucidating
activation patterns in decisions for immediate vs delayed
rewards.
Lastly, as difficulty in delaying gratification and self-
regulating is seen as maladaptive, immature and irrational
(e.g., 15), implications for practice include the devel-
opment of interventions to enhance DoG. Inasmuch
as DoG is a crucial ability associated with numerous
competencies and qualities, various open questions war-
rant investigation here. For example, research could
explore the benefits of DoG modifications in different age
groups and as a predictor of diverse outcomes across the
lifespan.
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